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Abstract
Mean Field Games (MFG) are those in which each agent assumes that the states of all others
are drawn in an i.i.d. manner from a common belief distribution, and optimizes accordingly.
The equilibrium concept here is a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE), and algorithms for learning
MFE in dynamic MFGs are unknown in general due to the non-stationary evolution of the belief
distribution. Our focus is on an important subclass that possess a monotonicity property called
Strategic Complementarities (MFG-SC). We introduce a natural refinement to the equilibrium
concept that we call Trembling-Hand-Perfect MFE (T-MFE), which allows agents to employ a
measure of randomization while accounting for the impact of such randomization on their payoffs.
We propose a simple algorithm for computing T-MFE under a known model. We introduce
both a model-free and a model based approach to learning T-MFE under unknown transition
probabilities, using the trembling-hand idea of enabling exploration. We analyze the sample
complexity of both algorithms. We also develop a scheme on concurrently sampling the system
with a large number of agents that negates the need for a simulator, even though the model is
non-stationary. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms via
examples motivated by real-world applications.
1 Introduction
Strategic complementarities refers to a well-established strategic game structure wherein the marginal
returns to increasing one’s strategy rise with increases in the competitors’ strategies [16, 22, 1].
Many practical scenarios with this property of strategic alignment, including pricing in oligopolistic
markets, adoption of network technology and standards, deposits and withdrawals in banking,
weapons purchasing in arms races etc., have been identified, and our running example is that of
dynamically adopting actions to prevent the spread of a computer or human virus, wherein stronger
actions towards maintaining health (eg., installing patches, or wearing masks) by members enhances
the returns (eg., system reliability or economic value) to a particular individual following suit.
The above examples are characterized by a large number of agents following the dynamics of
repeated action, reward, and state transition that is a characteristic of stochastic games. However,
analytical complexity implies that most work has focused on the static scenario with a small number
of agents (see [16]). Recently, there have been attempts to utilize the information structure of a
mean field game (MFG) [12, 21, 1, 10, 13, 14] to design algorithms to compute equilibria under a
known model in the large population setting [1]. Here, each agent assumes that the states of all
others are drawn in an i.i.d. manner from a common mean field belief distribution, and optimizes
accordingly. However, the model is non-stationary due to the change in the mean field distribution
at each time step, and provably convergent learning algorithms for identifying equilibrium strategies
under an unknown model are currently unavailable.
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Main Contributions: We study the problem of learning under an unknown model in stochastic
games with strategic complementarities under the mean field setting. Our main contributions are:
(i) We introduce the notion of trembling-hand perfection to the context of mean field games, under
which a known randomness is introduced into all strategies. Unlike an -greedy policy in which
randomization is added as an afterthought to the optimal action, under trembling-hand perfection,
optimal value is computed consistently while accounting for the randomness in the strategy.
(ii) We describe TQ-value iteration, based on generalized value iteration, as a means of computing
trembling-hand consistent TQ-values. We introduce a notion of equilibrium that we refer to as
trembling-hand-perfect mean field equilibrium (T-MFE), and show existence of T-MFE and a globally
convergent computational method in games with strategic complementarities.
(iii) We propose two learning algorithms—model-free and model-based—for learning T-MFE under
an unknown model. The algorithms follow an iterative structure of identifying TQ-values to find a
candidate strategy, and then taking only one-step Mckean-Vlasov dynamics to update the mean
field distribution. We show convergence and determine sample complexity bounds on each.
(iv) Finally, we develop a fully online learning scheme that utilizes the large population of agents to
concurrently sample the real world. Our algorithm only needs a one-step Mckean-Vlasov mean field
update under each strategy, which automatically happens via agents applying the current strategy
for one step. This obviates the need for a multi-step simulator required by typical RL approaches.
Related Work: There has recently been much interest in the intersection of machine learning and
collective behavior in the form of stochastic games with a large population. Many of the issues faced
in simultaneous learning and decision making are exemplified in [9], which presents an existence and
model-free learning algorithm for MFE under contraction assumptions on the trajectories of state
and action distributions over time. However, these conditions may not be verifiable for a given game
in a straightforward manner. A more traditional game theoretic approach is to focus on specific
classes of games that possess verifiable structural properties on information, payoffs and preferences.
In line with this approach is learning in structured MFGs, such as in linear-quadratic, oscillator
or potential game settings [11, 25, 5, 6]. Other approaches provide structure to the problem by
considering localized effects, such as local interactions [24], local convergence [15], or a local version
of Nash equilibrium [18]. While we are not aware of any work that considers learning in games
with strategic complementarities, a survey on the algorithmic aspects of multi-agent RL, including a
review of existing work in the mean field domain is available in [26].
Our focus on strategic complimentarities aligns with the notion of structured games with verifiable
properties. We develop a strategically consistent approach to learning via the trembling-hand concept,
rather than arbitrarily adding a modicum of exploration to best responses as do many existing works.
In turn, this allows us to explore both model-free and model-based methods to compute and learn
optimal trembling-hand perfect MFE, including showing global convergence and determining their
sample complexities. Furthermore, we exploit the large population setting to obtain samples without
the aid of a simulator, which enables learning directly from the real system.
2 Mean Field Games and Trembling-Hand Perfection
Mean Field Games: An N -agent stochastic dynamic game is represented as (S,A, P, (ri)Ni , γ),
where S and A are the state and action spaces, respectively, both assumed to be finite. At time k,
agent i has state sik ∈ S, takes action aik ∈ A, and receives a reward ri(sk, ak). Here, sk = (sik)Ni=1
is the system state and ak = (a
i
k)
N
i=1 is the joint action. The system state evolves according to
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transition kernel sk+1 ∼ P (·|sk, ak). Each agent aims at maximizing the infinite horizon cumulative
discounted reward E[
∑∞
k=0 γ
tri(sk, ak)], with discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1).
Identification of a best response is computationally hard under a Bayesian framework, and a
more realistic approach, aligned with a typical agent’s computational capabilities is to reduce the
information state of each agent to the so-called mean field state distribution [12, 21, 1, 10, 13, 14].
The mean field zk at time k is defined as zk(s) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 1{sik = s}, and is the empirical distribution
of the states of all agents. It represents the agent’s belief that the states of all others will be drawn
in an i.i.d. manner from zk. Agent i at time k receives a reward r
i(sik, a
i
k, zk), and its state evolves
according to sik+1 ∼ P (·|sik, aik, zk). The mean field approximation is accurate under structural
assumptions on correlation decay across agent states as the number of agents becomes asymptotically
large [8, 10].
We represent a MFG as Γ = (S,A, P, r, γ), and restrict our attention to stationary MFGs with a
homogeneous reward function. Here, all agents follow the same stationary strategy µ : S → P(A),
where P(A) is the probability distribution over the action space, and reward function ri = r for all i.
We assume that |r(s, a, z)| ≤ 1. The mean field zk evolves following the discrete time McKean-Vlasov
equation
zk+1 = Φ(zk, µ), where, zk+1(s
′) = Φ(zk, µ)(s′) =
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
zk(s)µ(s, a)P (s
′|s, a, zk). (1)
The value function Vµ,z corresponding to the strategy µ and the mean field z is defined as Vµ,z(s) =
E[
∑∞
k=0 γ
tr(sk, ak, z)|s0 = s], with, ak ∼ µ(sk, ·), sk+1 ∼ P (·|sk, ak, z).
Mean Field Games with Strategic Complementarities (MFG-SC): Structural assumptions
on the nature of the MFG are needed in order to show existence of an equilibrium, and to identify
convergent dynamics. Our focus is on a particular structure called strategic complementarities that
aligns the increase of an agent’s strategy with increases the competitors’ strategies [17, 22, 1].
We introduce some concepts before defining MFG-SC. The partially ordered set (X,) is called
a lattice if for all x, y ∈ X, the elements sup{x, y} and inf{x, y} are in X. X is a complete lattice
if for any S ⊂ X, both supS and inf S are in X. A function f : X → R is said to be supermodular
if f(sup{x, x′}) + f(inf{x, x′}) ≥ f(x) + f(x′) for any x, x′ ∈ X. Given lattices X,Y , a function
f : X × Y → R is said to have increasing differences in x and y if for all x′  x, y′  y, f(x′, y′)−
f(x′, y) ≥ f(x, y′)− f(x, y). A correspondence T : X → Y is non-decreasing if x′  x, y ∈ T (x), and
y′ ∈ T (x′) implies that sup{y, y′} ∈ T (x′) and inf{y, y′} ∈ T (x).
For probability distributions p, p′ ∈ P(X), we say p stochastically dominates p′, denoted as p SD
p′, if
∑
x∈X f(x)p(x) ≥
∑
x∈X f(x)p
′(x) for any bounded non-decreasing function f . The conditional
distribution p(·|y) is stochastically non-decreasing in y if for all y′  y, we have p(·|y′) SD p(·|y).
Finally, the conditional distribution p(·|y, z) has stochastically increasing differences in y and z if∑
x f(x)p(x|y, z) has increasing differences in y and z for any bounded non-decreasing function f .
We now give the formal definition of mean field games with strategic complementarities [1].
Definition 1 (MFG-SC). Let Γ be a stationary mean field game. We say that Γ is a mean field
game with strategic complementaries if it has the following properties:
(i) Reward function: r(s, a, z) is non-decreasing in s, supermodular in (s, a), and has increasing
differences in (s, a) and z. Also, maxa r(s, a, z) is non-decreasing in s for all fixed z.
(ii) Transition probability: P (·|s, a, z) is stochastically supermodular in (s, a), has stochastically
increasing differences in (s, a) and z, and is stochastically non-decreasing in each of s, a, and z.
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MFG-SC Example—Infection Spread: We assume a large but fixed population of agents
(computers or humans). At any time step, an agent may leave the system (network or town)
with probability ζ, and is immediately replaced with a new agent. The state of an agent s ∈ Z+
is its health level, and the agent can take action a ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...|A|} (installing security patches,
wearing a mask etc.) to stay healthy. The susceptibility of each agent, p(s) is a decreasing function
in state (higher health implies lower susceptibility). At each time step, the agent interacts with
the ensemble of agents who have a mean field state distribution z. We define infection intensity
iz = cfp(
∑
s∈S sz(s)), which can be interpreted as the probability of getting infected via interaction
with the population.
The resultant next state s′ = (s+ a−w1)+1{E1}+ (s+ a)1{E2}+w21{E3}, where (.)+ denotes
projection around zero (state is non-negative), w1, w2 ∈ Z+ are realizations of non-negative random
variables, and Eis are mutually exclusive events with probabilities iz(1− ζ), (1− iz)(1− ζ), and ζ,
respectively. Events E1 and E2 correspond to the agent remaining in the system, and being infected
(health may deteriorate) or not infected, respectively. E3 is the event that the agent leaves and is
replaced with an agent with random state (regeneration). An agent receives a reward that depends
on its own immunity 1 − p(s) as well as that of the population (i.e., system value increases with
immunity), but pays for its action. Hence, r(s, a, z) = δ1(1− p(s)) + δ2
∑
s∈S z(s)(1− p(s))− δ3a,
where δis are positive constants.
It is easy to verify that the model has non-decreasing differences in the transition matrix. Also,
it encourages crowd seeking behavior, where the mean field positively affects rewards obtained.
Showing that it has strategic complementarities is straightforward.
Trembling-Hand-Perfect Mean Field Equilibrium: The notion of trembling-hand-perfection
is a means of refining the Nash equilibrium concept to account for the fact that equilibria that
naturally occur are often those that are optimal when a known amount of randomness is introduced
into the strategies employed to ensure that they are totally mixed, i.e., all actions will be played
with some (however small) probability [3]. Thus, the agent is restricted to only playing such mixed
(randomized) strategies, but maintains strategic consistency in that it accounts for the probability of
playing each action while calculating the expected payoff of such a totally mixed strategy.
Formalizing the above thoughts, we denote the set of trembling-hand strategies as Π. A
trembling-hand strategy µ ∈ Π is a mapping µ : S → P(A), where P(A) is the set of -randomized
probability vectors over A. Any probability vector in P(A) has the value (1− ) for one element
and the value /(|A| − 1) for all the other elements. Thus, any µ ∈ Π has the following form:
µ(s, a) = (1− ) for a = as for some as and µ(s, a) = /(|A|− 1) for all other a ∈ A. In the standard
reinforcement learning parlance, Π is essentially the set of all -greedy policies.
The main difference between a trembling-hand strategy and an -greedy policy lies in the value
function. Recall that under the -greedy idea, the agent computes the pure (deterministic) best
response policy, and then arbitrarily adds randomization. However, under the strategic game setting,
choosing a strategy that could result in an arbitrary loss of value is impermissible. Rather, the agent
must compute the best trembling-hand strategy, i.e., it must account for the impact on value of the
 randomness. Formally, we first define the optimal trembling-hand value function corresponding to
the mean field z as V ∗z = maxµ∈Π Vµ,z. The optimal trembling hand strategy µ∗z corresponding to
the mean field z is then defined as µ∗z ∈ Ψ(z), where Ψ(z) = arg maxµ∈Π Vµ,z.
We define trembling-hand-prefect mean field equilibrium (T-MFE) in terms of a trembling-
hand strategy µ∗ and a mean field distribution z∗ that must jointly satisfy, (i) optimality—the
strategy µ∗ must be superior to all other strategies, given the belief z∗, and (ii) consistency—given a
candidate mean field distribution z∗, the strategy µ∗ must regenerate z∗ under the McKean-Vlasov
dynamics (1).
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Definition 2 (T-MFE). Let Γ be a stationary mean field game. A trembling-hand-perfect mean field
equilibrium (µ∗, z∗) of Γ is a strategy µ∗ ∈ Π and a mean field z∗ such that, (optimality condition) µ∗ ∈
Ψ(z∗), and (consistency condition) z∗ = Φ(z∗, µ∗)
3 Existence and Computation of T-MFE
Existence of T-MFE: We first introduce a method to compute the optimal trembling-hand
value function V ∗z for a given mean field z. Note that classical value iteration for any given finite
MDP will converge under deterministic policies (pure strategies)—something that is not possible
under our restriction to trembling hand strategies Π, which only allows totally mixed strategies.
We overcome this issue by using a generalized value iteration approach [19]. Here, rather than the
value function, we compute the Q-value function, which for a strategy µ and a given mean field z is
defined as Qµ,z(s, a) = E[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st, at, z)|s0 = s, a0 = a], with, at ∼ µ(st, ·), st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at, z).
The optimal trembling-hand Q-value function (TQ-value function) for a given mean field z is then
defined as Q∗z = maxµ∈Π Qµ,z. The optimal trembling-hand strategy µ∗z for a given mean field z
can then be computed as µ∗z = piQ∗z .
For any given Q-value function, define the trembling-hand strategy piQ and the function G(Q) as
piQ(s, a) =
{
(1− ) for a = arg maxbQ(s, b)
/(|A| − 1) for a 6= arg maxbQ(s, b) , G(Q)(s) =
∑
a∈A
piQ(s, a) Q(s, a). (2)
Note that piQ is the usual -greedy policy with respect to Q. Using the above notation, we define
the TQ-value operator Fz for a given mean field z as
Fz(Q)(s, a) = r(s, a, z) + γ
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a, z) G(Q)(s′). (3)
The TQ-value operator Fz has properties similar to the standard Bellman operator. In particular,
we show below that Fz is a contraction with Q
∗
z as its unique fixed point.
Proposition 1. (i) Fz is a contraction mapping in sup norm for all z ∈ P(S). More precisely,
‖Fz(Q1)− Fz(Q2)‖∞ ≤ γ‖Q1 −Q2‖∞ for any Q1, Q2, and for all z ∈ P(S).
(ii) The optimal trembling-hand Q-value function Q∗z for a given mean field z is the unique fixed
point of Fz, i.e., Fz(Q
∗
z) = Q
∗
z.
The contraction property of Fz implies that the iteration Qm+1,z = Fz(Qm,z) will converge to
the unique fixed point of Fz, i.e., Qm,z → Q∗z. We call this procedure as TQ-value iteration.
From the above result, we can compute the optimal trembling-hand strategy for a given mean
field z. However, it is not clear if there exists a T-MFE (z∗, µ∗) that simultaneously satisfies the
optimality condition and consistency condition. We answer this question affirmatively below.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a stationary mean field game with strategic complementarities. Then, there
exists a trembling-hand-perfect mean field equilibrium for Γ.
The proof of existence follows naturally from the monotonicity properties of MFG-SC. Thus,
given this game structure, no additional conditions are needed to show existence.
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Computing T-MFE: Given that a T-MFE exists, the next goal is to devise an algorithm to
compute a T-MFE. A natural approach is to use a form of best-response dynamics as follows. Given
the candidate mean field zk, the trembling best-response strategy µk can be computed as µk = Ψ(zk).
While the typical approach would be to then compute the stationary distribution under µk, we simply
update the next mean field zk+1 by using just one-step Mckean-Vlasov dynamics as zk+1 = Φ(zk, µk),
and the cycle continues. While the approach is intuitive and reminiscent of the best-response dynamics
proposed in [1], it is not clear that it will converge to any equilibrium. We show that in mean field
games with strategic complementarities, such a trembling best-response (T-BR) process converges to
a T-MFE. Our computation algorithm, which we call the T-BR algorithm, is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: T-BR Algorithm
1: Initialization: Initial mean field z0
2: for k = 0, 1, 2, .. do
3: For the mean field zk, compute the optimal TQ-Value function Q
∗
zk
using the TQ-value
iteration Qm+1,zk = F (Qm,zk)
4: Compute the strategy µk = Ψ(zk) as the trembling-hand strategy w.r.t Q
∗
zk
, i.e, µk = pi

Q∗zk
5: Compute the next mean field zk+1 = Φ(zk, µk)
6: end for
We now give the formal convergence result of the T-BR algorithm.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a stationary mean field game with strategic complementarities. Let {zk}
and {µk} be the sequences of mean fields and strategies generated according to Algorithm 1. Then
µk → µ∗ and zk → z∗ as k →∞ where (µ∗, z∗) constitutes a T-MFE of Γ.
Remark 1. Consider the sequence of mean fields {zk} generated by the T-BR algorithm. According
to Theorem 2, there exists a finite k0 = k0(¯) such that ‖zk − z∗‖ ≤ ¯ for all k ≥ k0, where z∗ is the
T-MFE. A precise characterization of k0 is difficult because the convergence of the T-BR algorithm
is based on monotonicity properties of MFG-SC, rather than on contraction arguments.
4 Learning T-MFE
We address the problem of learning T-MFE when the model is unknown. In this section, we assume
the availability of a simulator, which, given the current state s, current action a and current mean
field z, can generate the next state s′ ∼ P (·|s, a, z). We discuss how to learn directly from real-world
samples in the next section. We also assume that the reward function is known, as is common in the
literature. We now introduce two reinforcement learning algorithms—a model-free algorithm and a
model-based algorithm—for learning T-MFE.
4.1 Model-Free TMFQ-Learning Algorithm for learning T-MFE
We now describe the TMFQ-learning algorithm, which builds on the T-BR algorithm. Recall that
the T-BR algorithm uses knowledge of the model, P in two locations. The first is that at each
step k, for a given mean field zk, the optimal TQ-value function Q
∗
zk
is computed using TQ-value
iteration. In the learning approach, we use the generalized Q-learning framework [19] as the basis
for the model-free TQ-learning algorithm as follows:
Qt+1,zk(st, at) = (1− αt)Qt,zk(st, at) + αt(r(st, at, zk) + γG(Qt,zk)(st+1)) (4)
where αt is the appropriate learning rate. Here, the state sequence {st} is generated using the
simulator by fixing the mean field zk, i.e., st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at, zk),∀t. Using the properties of the
generalized Q-learning formulation [19], it can be shown that Qt,zk → Q∗zk as t→∞.
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The second location where the model is needed in T-BR is for the one-step McKean-Vlasov update.
In the learning approach, given the mean field zk and the strategy µk, the next mean field zk+1
can be easily estimated to a desired accuracy using the simulator. The precise numerical approach
is presented as the Next-MF scheme described in Algorithm 3 (presented in the supplementary
material). We can now combine these steps to obtain the TMFQ-learning algorithm presented in
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: TMFQ-Learning Algorithm for T-MFE
1: Initialization: Initial mean field z0
2: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
3: Initialize time step t← 0. Initialize s0, Q0,zk
4: repeat
5: Take action at ∼ piQt,zk (st), observe reward and the next state st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at, zk)
6: Update Qt,zk according to TQ-learning (4)
7: t← t+ 1
8: until ‖Qt,zk −Qt−1,zk‖∞ < 1
9: Get Qzk = Qt,zk . Get the strategy µk = pi

Qzk
10: Get the next mean field zk+1 = Next-MF(zk, µk)
11: end for
We first present an asymptotic convergence result of TMFQ-learning based on a perfect accuracy
assumption on the TQ-learning and Next-MF steps, i.e., they are run to convergence. A complex,
but more accurate analysis using two-timescale stochastic approximation is possible without this
assumption. Instead, we will remove this assumption, and provide a PAC-type result further below.
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a stationary mean field game with strategic complementarities. Let {zk} and
{µk} be the sequences of the mean fields and policies generated by Algorithm 2. Then µk → µ∗ and
zk → z∗ as k →∞ where (µ∗, z∗) is a T-MFE of Γ.
In a practical implementation, we may only run the TQ-learning step and the Next-MF step
for a finite number of iterations each. Hence, we develop a sample complexity bound under which
TQ-learning and Next-MF provide an appropriate accuracy. We desire to compare TMFQ-learning
with T-BR after k0 iterations, where k0 is the number of iterations of T-BR that yields a mean field
that is ¯-close to the T-MFE z∗. We make some necessary assumptions that are required for such a
characterization.
Assumption 1. (i) There exists C1 > 0 such that ‖r(·, ·, z)− r(·, ·, z˜)‖1 ≤ C1 ‖z − z˜‖1, for all
z, z˜ ∈ P(S).
(ii) There exists a C2 > 0 such that ‖P (·|·, ·, z)− P (·|·, ·, z˜)‖1 ≤ C2 ‖z − z˜‖1, for all z, z˜ ∈ P(S).
(iii) Let Pµ,z(s
′|s) = ∑a µ(s, a)P (s′|s, a, z). Let µ1, µ2 be the trembling-hand policies corresponding
to Q1, Q2, i.e., µ1 = pi

Q1
, µ2 = pi

Q2
. Then there exists a C3 > 0 such that ‖Pz,µ1 − Pz,µ2‖1 ≤
C3 ‖Q1 −Q2‖∞ for all z ∈ P(S) and for any given Q1, Q2.
Assumption 1.(i) and 1.(ii) indicate that the reward function and transition kernel are Lipschitz
with respect to the mean field, while Assumption 1.(iii) indicates that the distance between the
Markov chains induced by two policies on the same transition kernel are upper bounded by a constant
times the distance between their respective Q functions. We then have the following result.
Theorem 4. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let {zk} and {µk} be the sequences of the mean fields
and strategies generated by the TMFQ-learning algorithm. Assume that for each zk, TQ-learning
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(according to (4)) update is performed T0 number of times, i.e., Qzk = QT0,zk . For any given
0 ≤ ¯, δ¯ < 1, let k0 = k0(¯) and T0 be given as
T0 = O
((
B2L1+3wV 2max
β2¯2
ln
(2Bk0|S||A|Vmax
δ¯β¯
)) 1w
+
(
L
β
ln(
BVmax
¯
)
) 1
1−w
)
, (5)
where B = (1 + C2 + C3D)
k0+1(C3 + 1), D = (C1 + γC2)/(1− γ), Vmax = 1/(1− γ), β = (1− γ)/2,
L is an uppper bound on the covering time 1, and w ∈ (1/2, 1). Then,
P(‖zk0 − z∗‖ ≤ 2¯) ≥ (1− δ¯). (6)
We may also eliminate the dependence of the constant term B on k0 under a contraction
assumption on the McKean-Vlasov dynamics Φ (for instance, following conditions similar to [4]).
Assumption 2. (i) Let Q1, Q2 be two arbitrary Q-value functions and let µ1 = pi

Q1
, µ2 = pi

Q2
.
Let z1, z2 be two arbitrary mean fields. Then there exists positive constants C4 and C5 such that
‖Φ(z1, µ1)−Φ(z2, µ2)‖1 ≤ C4‖z1 − z2‖1 +C5‖Q1 −Q2‖∞. Also assume that (C4 +C5D) < 1, where
D = (C1 + γC2)/(1− γ).
Corollary 1. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. Then, the we obtain the bound on T0 as
in (5) with B = (C5 + 1)/(1− (C4 + C5D)), which does not depend on k0.
4.2 Generative Model-Based Reinforcement Learning for T-MFE
We now develop a model-based variant of the T-BR algorithm. Non-stationarity in our system
(model changes at each step) implies that there is no single model that can be learned. Our approach
follows the generation of a new model each time that the mean field evolves under a T-BR like
approach.
At each iteration, we first estimate the model P (·|·, ·, zk) for the given zk using n0 simulator
samples for each (s, a). We next define the approximate TQ-value operator F̂zk as in (3) by replacing
the actual model P with the estimated model P̂ . It is straightforward to show that F̂zk is also a
contraction. This ensures that approximate TQ-value iteration will converge to an approximate
TQ-value function Q̂∗zk , which will, of course, have an error with respect to the true TQ-value function
Q∗zk . We determine the trembling-hand best response strategy with respect to Q̂
∗
zk
. Finally, the next
mean field zk+1 is obtained using this strategy and the estimated model in the McKean-Vlasov update
equation, denoted by Φˆ(·, ·). The GMBL algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 4 (supplementary
material).
Note that we are not estimating the model for all the possible mean fields, but only for the
sequence {zk}. So, if the process converges in a finite number of steps, then we need only a finite
number of simulation samples. We show that this is indeed true in the theorem below.
Theorem 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let {zk} and {µk} be sequences of mean fields and strategies
generated by the GMBL algorithm. Assume that the estimate P̂ (·|·, ·, zk) is obtained by a total of
N0 = n0|S||A| simulator samples. For any given 0 ≤ ¯, δ¯ < 1, let k0 = k0(¯) and N0 be such that
N0 = O
(
|S||A |max
(
2V 4maxB
2
2
log
(
2|S||A|k0
δ
)
,
2B2
2
log
(
2|S||S||A|k0
δ
)))
(7)
1Covering time of a state-action pair sequence is the number of steps needed to visit all state-action pairs starting
from any arbitrary state-action pair [7].
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where B = (1 + C2 + C3D)
k0+1, D = (C1 + γC2)/(1− γ), Vmax = 1/(1− γ). Then,
P(‖zk0 − z∗‖ ≤ 2¯) ≥ (1− δ¯). (8)
Note that a result similar to that of Corollary 1 can easily be shown here as well under the same
assumption. We omit details due to page limitations.
5 Online Learning of T-MFE
The availability of a large population of agents that regenerate to occupy all states, and explore
all actions via trembling hand strategies suggests that we can do away with the need for a system
simulator via an algorithm that simply aggregates these concurrently generated samples, and
computes a new strategy that is then pushed to all agents. While this sounds attractive, a typical
RL approach would require that given the current strategy µk and mean field zk, we would need to
compute the stationary distribution of the model Pzk,µk , and set it as the next mean field. This would
preclude learning without a simulator, since running one step in the real world would immediately
cause a mean field update to zk+1, and induce a new model P.,zk+1 , making the system non-stationary.
The fact that our RL algorithms only need a one-step McKean-Vlasov update under each strategy
implies that we can indeed simply apply µk to the system, and set the resultant state distribution as
zk+1. However, we face the issue that the samples obtained pertain to Pzk,µk , whereas the system
model is now P.,zk+1 , and so an online sample-based trembling-hand strategy µk+1 will lag the current
system model by one step. Fortunately, convergence of the TMFQ-learning approach is robust to
this lag, and we present its online version in Algorithm 5 (supplementary material). The PAC result
is similar TMFQ-learning, with accuracy increasing in the number of agents, rather than with the
number of samples as in Theorem 4, and is hence omitted.
6 Experiments
We consider the Infection Spread example described in Section 2. State space is S = {0, . . . , 24} with
0 being the lowest health level. Action space is A = {0, . . . , 4} with 4 being the strongest preventive
action. Details of the parameters, as well as more experiments are presented in the supplementary
materials. In all the figures shown below, the quantities on the y-axis are averaged over 20 runs,
with the thick line showing the averaged value and the band around showing the standard deviation.
Figure 1 shows the final mean field distribution obtained by each algorithm, simulated with 1000
agents. Note that all of them converge to the same mean field. Figure 2 is a heat map of the
converged TQ-value function. Observe that the values are non-decreasing in state, showing alignment
of incentives across agents. Figure 3 shows the final mean field distribution obtained by the online
TMFQ-learning for different values of cf . As expected, more agents are in the lower health state
for larger cf . Figure 4 shows the evolution of average health level of the population,
∑
s szk(s),
with iteration number k, for online TMFQ-learning. This plot indicates that the convergence of
the algorithm is fairly fast. Figure 5 also shows the rate of convergence of of the mean field with
different number of agents. Here, z∗ is the final mean field obtained by the GMBL algorithm with
n0 = 500. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the corresponding mean population state. Figure 5 and 6
show poor convergence with 100 agents, which is too small for the mean field assumption to hold.
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7 Conclusions
This paper introduced the notion of trembling-hand perfection to MFG, as a means of provid-
ing strategically consistent exploration. We showed existence of T-MFE in MFG with strategic
complementarities, and developed an algorithm for computation. Based on this algorithm, we
developed model-free, model-based and fully online learning algorithms, and provided PAC bounds
on their performance. Experiments illustrated the accuracy and good convergence properties of our
algorithms.
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A Algorithms Description
A.1 Next-MF Function for One-Step McKean-Vlasov Update
Algorithm 3: Next-MF
1: Input: Mean field z and strategy µ
2: Initialize zˆ, sample number j ← 0
3: repeat
4: Sample the state s ∼ z(·), action a ∈ µ(s, ·), next state s′ ∼ P (·|s, a, z)
5: zˆ(s′)← zˆ(s′) + 1
6: z¯j = normalize(zˆ)
7: j ← j + 1
8: until ‖z¯j − z¯j−1‖1 ≤ 2
9: z¯ = z¯j
10: return z¯
Algorithm 3 estimates the next mean field according to equation (1). We maintain a frequency
estimate of s′ in line 5 and normalize the frequency estimate to obtain a density function in line 6.
Note that s′ is sampled according to line 4.
A.2 GMBL Algorithm for T-MFE
Algorithm 4: GMBL Algorithm for T-MFE
1: Initialization: Initial mean field z0
2: for k = 0, 1, 2, .. do
3: For the mean field zk estimate the model to get P̂ (·|·, ·, zk) by taking
n0 next-state samples for each state-action pair (s, a)
4: Compute Q̂∗zk using the approximate TQ-value iteration Q̂m+1,zk = F̂zk(Q̂m,zk)
5: Compute the strategy µk = pi

Q̂∗zk
. Then compute the next mean field zk+1 = Φ̂(zk, µk)
6: end for
A.3 Online TMFQ-learning Algorithm for T-MFE
In Algorithm 5, at time k the current mean field is zk and agents execute strategy µk−1. This
causes a transition of mean field to zk+1. For learning the TQ-value function, we aggregate the
samples from all the agents. The execution of trembling hand strategies ensures that we have samples
of each (s, a) pair, assuming that the mean field has non-zero mass in each state and number of
agents is sufficiently large. For faster learning, we bootstrap the initial TQ-value for each k to the
final TQ-value corresponding to the previous mean field, i.e., Q0,zk = Qk−1. Note that t in the above
algorithm description does not refer to time, but rather the samples collected from the agents. In
the limit of large number of agents, the algorithm will converges.
B Proofs of Results in Section 3
We use the following result from [2]
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Algorithm 5: Online TMFQ-learning Algorithm for T-MFE
1: Initialize mean field z0 and strategy µ0
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
3: for agents i = 1, 2, . . . , I do
4: Observe the current state sik, take action a
i
k ∼ µk−1(sik),
get reward rik, observe the next state s
i
k+1
5: Add the data point dik = (s
i
k, a
i
k, r
i
k, s
i
k+1) to the memory buffer
6: end for
7: t = 0, Q0,zk(s, a) = Qk−1(s, a),∀(s, a)
8: for (s, a, r, s′) ∈ memory buffer do
9: Qt+1,zk(s, a) = (1− αt)Qt,zk(s, a) + αt(r + γG(Qt,zk(s′, ·)))
10: t← t+ 1
11: end for
Qzk = Qt,zk
12: µk = pi

Qzk
13: end for
Lemma 1 ([2]). For any Q1, Q2, and for any s ∈ S,
|G(Q1)(s)−G(Q2)(s)| ≤ max
a
|Q1(s, a)−Q2(s, a)|.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. For any given (s, a) ∈ S ×A and mean field z,
|Fz(Q1)(s, a)− Fz(Q2)(s, a)| ≤ γ|
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a, z)(G(Q1)(s′)−G(Q2)(s′))|
(a)
≤ γ
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a, z) max
b
|Q1(s′, b)−Q2(s′, b)| ≤ γ‖Q1 −Q2‖∞
where (a) follows from Lemma 1. Since (s, a) ∈ S×A was arbitrary, we have ‖Fz(Q1)−Fz(Q2)‖∞ ≤
γ‖Q1 − Q2‖∞. Existence of a unique fixed point for Fz follows directly from the Banach’s fixed
point theorem since Fz is a contraction. The claim that this unique fixed point is equal to Q
∗
z follows
from the Bellman optimality principle.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
We follow a proof approach that uses the strategic complementarity conditions to establish some
monotone properties, and exploit that to show the existence of T-MFE and the convergence of T-BR
algorithm. We first state some useful results from [1]. Note that, however, since we are considering
trembling-hand polices, proofs in [1] are not directly applicable to our setting.
Lemma 2 (Lemma 4 in [1]). Suppose that Vz(s) is a non-decreasing bounded function in s and
has increasing differences in s and z. Then,
∑
s′∈S P (s
′|s, a, z)Vz(s′) is non-decreasing in s and a
and has increasing differences in (s, a) and z. Moreover, the function V ′z(s) defined as, V ′z(s) =
maxa(r(s, a, z) + γ
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, a, z)Vz(s)), is non-decreasing in s and has increasing differences in s
and z.
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Lemma 3 (Lemma 6 in [1]). Suppose that Vz(s) is non-decreasing in s and has increasing differences
in s and z. Define a correspondence
Ω(s, z) = arg max
a∈A
(r(s, a, z) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a, z)Vz(s′)).
Then, Ω is a non-decreasing correspondence in (s, z).
Proposition 2. Let V ∗z and µ∗z be the optimal trembling-hand value function and optimal trembling-
hand strategy corresponding to mean field z. Then, V ∗z (s) is non-decreasing in s and has increasing
differences in s and z. Moreover, µ∗z is stochastically non-decreasing in s and z.
Proof. Let {Qm,z,m ≥ 0} be the TQ-value iterates corresponding to a mean field z. If arg maxbQm,z(s, b)
is not unique, then piQm,z can be defined in more than one way. We define it as
piQm,z(s, a) =
{
1−  for a = sup{arg maxbQm,z(s, b)}
/(|A| − 1) for a 6= sup{arg maxbQm,z(s, b)}
(9)
Note that the sup of a set is well defined with respect to a lattice according to the definition of
MFG-SC. In the following we denote piQm,z simply as µm,z.
By definition, V ∗z = G(Q∗z) and define Vm,z = G(Qm,z). To show that V ∗z (s) is non-decreasing in
s and has increasing differences in s and z, it suffices to show Vm,z(s) has the same properties for all
m. This is because, since G is continuous, monotonicity and increasing differences are preserved
under limits.
Letting Q0,z(s, a) = 0 for all (s, a) ∈ S×A, we have Q1,z(s, a) = r(s, a, z). Then, Q1,z(s, a) is non-
decreasing in s and has increasing differences in s and z by Definition 1. Define the correspondence
Ωm as
Ωm(s, z) = arg max
a∈A
(r(s, a, z) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a, z)Vm−1,z(s′)).
By Lemma 3, Ω1(s, z) = arg maxQ1,z(s, a) is non-decreasing in s and z. Using this, we can conclude
that µ1,z = pi

Q1,z
is stochastically non-decreasing in s and z for  such that (1− ) > /(|A| − 1). To
see this, first note that for  = 0, the deterministic strategy piQ1,z is non-decreasing in s and z by
Lemma 3. Now, for  with (1− ) > /(|A| − 1), piQ1,z is stochastically non-decreasing in s and z
because the probability of the maximizing action is greater than all other actions. Thus, µm,z is
stochastically non-decreasing in s and z for all m ∈ N if each Qm,z is non-decreasing in s and has
increasing differences in s and z.
Now, recall that V1,z(s) =
∑
a µ1,z(s, a)Q1,z(s, a) = (1 − )Q1,z(s, a¯) + 
∑
aQ1,z(s, a) where
a¯ = sup{arg maxQ1,z(s, a)}. Since Q1,z(s, a) is non-decreasing in s and has increasing differences in
s and z for all a, we can conclude that V1,z(s) is is non-decreasing in s and has increasing differences
in s and z.
As the induction hypothesis, suppose that both Qm,z(s, a) and Vm,z(s) are non-decreasing in s
and z and have increasing differences in s and z and µm,z is stochastically non-decreasing in s and z.
Induction step is as follows: By Definition 1 and Lemma 2, both r(s, a, z) and γ
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, a, z)Vm,z(s′)
are non-decreasing in s and have increasing differences in (s, a) and z. Therefore, Qm+1,z(s, a) =
r(s, a, z) + γ
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, a, z)Vm,z(s′) also satisfies the same properties. By Lemma 3, notice that
Ωm+1(s, z) := arg maxa∈A{Qm+1,z(s, a)} is non-decreasing in (s, z) and therefore µm+1,z = piQm+1,z
defined as in (9) is stochastically non-decreasing in s and z as argued before. Finally, Vm+1,z(s) =∑
a µm+1,z(s, a)Qm+1,z(s, a) = (1−)Qm,z(s, a¯)+
∑
aQm,z(s, a) where a¯ = sup{arg maxQm+1,z(s, a)}
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is non-decreasing in s and has increasing differences in s and z because Qm+1,z(s, a) is non-decreasing
in s and has increasing differences in s and z for all a.
Since TQ-value iteration converges, Q∗z(s, a) and V ∗z (s) are non-decreasing in s and have increasing
differences in s and z. By repeating the same argument again, Ω(s, z) = arg maxa∈A{Q∗z(s, a)} is
non-decreasing in (s, z). So, µ∗z = piQ∗z is stochastically non-decreasing in s and z.
Tarskis fixed-point theorem [20] ensures that monotone functions on a lattice have a fixed point.
We use that result to prove the existence of T-MFE. We first state Tarskis fixed-point theorem for
completeness.
Theorem 6 (Tarski’s Fixed-point Theorem [20]). Suppose that L is a nonempty complete lattice,
and T : L → L is a non-decreasing function. Then the set of fixed points of T is a nonempty
complete lattice.
We now give the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. For any strategy µ such that µ is stochastically non-decreasing in s, and
for any given mean fields z and z′, define the function Kµ,z(z′) as
Kµ,z(z
′)(s′) =
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
z′(s)µ(s, a)P (s′|s, a, z).
From [1, Lemma 7], for z2 SD z1 and z′2 SD z′1 and µ2(s, ·) SD µ1(s, ·) with µ2 and µ1 are
stochastically non-decreasing in s, we have Kµ2,z2(z
′
2) SD Kµ1,z1(z′1).
Observe that McKean-Vlasov update function Φ(z, µ) is a special case of Kµ,z(z
′) by setting
z′ = z. By the above argument, Φ(z, µ) = Kµ,z(z) is stochastically non-decreasing in (z, µ) provided
that µ is stochastically non-decreasing in s.
Define Υ : P(S) → P(S) as Υ(z) = Φ(z, µ∗z) where µ∗z is the optimal trembling-hand strategy
corresponding to the mean field z. Recall that, by Proposition 2, µ∗z is stochastically non-decreasing
in s and z. Then, for z2 SD z1, Υ(z2) = Φ(z2, µ∗z2) SD Φ(z1, µ∗z1) = Υ(z1). From this, we
can conclude that Υ is a stochastically non-decreasing function in z and hence Υ(·) has a fixed
point by Tarski’s theorem (Theorem 6). In other words, there exists a z∗ such that z∗ = Υ(z∗) =
Φ(z∗, µ∗z∗). This implies that there exists a mean field z∗ and strategy µ∗ such that they satisfy the
optimality condition (i.e., µ∗ = µ∗z∗) and the consistency condition (i.e. z∗ = Φ(z∗, µ∗z∗)). Thus,
there exists a trembling-hand-perfect mean field equilibrium for mean field games with strategic
complementarities.
Proof of Theorem 2. We exploit two key monotonicity properties established before. First, from
proof of Theorem 1, Υ(z) is stochastically non-decreasing in z. Second, from Proposition 2, an
optimal trembling-hand strategy µ∗z corresponding to a mean field z is stochastically non-decreasing
in s and z.
Let z0 be the smallest distribution by initialization in the SD ordering and let {Qzk , zk, k ≥ 0}
be the TQ-value functions and mean fields generated corresponding to Algorithm 1. In the following,
we denote an optimal trembling-hand strategy µ∗zk corresponding to a mean field zk simply as µk. By
Proposition 2, µ0 = pi

Q∗z0
is stochastically non-decreasing in s and z. Hence we take the following as
our induction base: z0 SD Υ(z0) = z1 and µ0(s, ·) SD µ1(s, ·) for all s where µ1 is stochastically
non-decreasing in s and z.
Now as the induction hypothesis, suppose that z0 SD Υ(z0) = z1 SD Υ(z1) = z2 SD · · · SD
Υ(zk−1) = zk and that µ0(s, ·) SD µ1(s, ·) SD · · · SD µk(s, ·) for all s where µi are stochastically
non-decreasing in s and z.
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Then as an induction step, we have Υ(zk−1) = zk SD zk+1 = Υ(zk) because Υ(z) is stochastically
non-decreasing in z. Now, since zk SD zk+1 and both µk and µk+1 are stochastically non-decreasing
in s and z, it follows that µk(s, ·) SD µk+1(s, ·) for all s.
Observe that Π is compact for a fixed  > 0 and since (µk)k∈N ⊂ Π is a stochastically non-
decreasing (monotone) sequence, there must be a pointwise limit µ∗ such that µk → µ∗ as k →∞.
Moreover, P(S) is also compact since we assume that |S| is finite. Since (zk)k∈N ⊂ P(S) is a
stochastically non-decreasing (monotone) sequence, there must be a limit z∗ such that zk → z∗ as
k →∞.
It is straight forward to show that the optimal trembling-hand strategy µ∗z and Υ(z) are continuous
in z. So, since µk → µ∗z∗ and zk → z∗, we can conclude that µ∗ = µ∗z∗ and z∗ = Υ(z∗) = Φ(z∗, µ∗).
This concludes the proof that T-BR converges to a T-MFE.
C Proof of the Results in Section 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We only sketch the proof since it is almost the same to the proof of Theorem 2. At each
time k with a fixed zk, the value of generalized Q-learning converges, i.e., Qt,zk → Q∗zk as t→∞.
Then, under assumptions of the model, Q∗zk satisfies the same complementarity properties for each
k ∈ N. Thus, we can conclude that, for all k ∈ N, µk(s, ·) SD µk+1(s, ·) for all s ∈ S where each µk
is stochastically non-decreasing in s and z and that zk SD Υ(zk) = zk+1. The rest of the proof
that the limits exist follows the same as in the proof of Theorem 2.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4
We first prove some useful lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let z1 and z2 be two arbitrary mean fields and Q
∗
z1 and Q
∗
z2 be the optimal TQ-value
functions corresponding to them. Then, under Assumption 1,
||Q∗z1 −Q∗z2 ||∞ ≤ D||z1 − z2||1 (10)
where D = (C1 + γC2)/(1− γ)2.
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Proof. For any (s, a) ∈ S ×A,
|Qz1(s, a)−Qz2(s, a)|
≤ |r(s, a, z1)− r(s, a, z2)|+ γ|
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a, z1)G(Qz1)(s′)−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a, z2)G(Qz2)(s′)|
(a)
≤ C1‖z1 − z2‖1 + γ|
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a, z1)|(G(Qz1)(s′)−G(Qz2)(s′))|
+ γ
∑
s′
|P (s′|s, a, z1)− P (s′|s, a, z2)||G(Qz2)(s′)|
(b)
≤ C1‖z1 − z2‖1 + γ|
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a, z1) max
a
|Qz1(s′, a)−Qz2(s′, a)|
+ γ
∑
s′
|P (s′|s, a, z1)− P (s′|s, a, z2)||G(Qz2)‖∞
(c)
≤ C1‖z1 − z2‖1 + γ‖Qz1 −Qz2‖∞ +
γ
(1− γ)‖P (·|·, ·, z1)− P (·|·, ·, z2)‖1
(d)
≤ C1‖z1 − z2‖1 + γ‖Qz1 −Qz2‖∞ +
γ
(1− γ)C2‖z1 − z2‖1. (11)
Here (a) follows from Assumption 1.(i), (b) from Lemma 1, (c) from the fact that the maximum
Q-value for a finite MDP is 1/(1−γ), and (d) from Assumption 1.(ii). Since (11) is true for any (s, a),
by taking the maximum on the left hand side and re arranging, we get ‖Qz1 −Qz2‖∞ ≤ D‖z1− z2‖1,
where D = C11−γ +
γC2
(1−γ)2 .
Lemma 5. Let Q1, Q2 be two arbitrary TQ-value functions and let µ1 and µ2 be the trembling-hand
strategies corresponding to them, i.e., µ1 = pi

Q1
, µ2 = pi

Q2
. Let z1, z2 be two arbitrary mean fields.
Then, under Assumption 1,
‖Φ(z1, µ1)− Φ(z2, µ2)‖1 ≤ (1 + C2)‖z1 − z2‖1 + C3‖Q1 −Q2‖∞. (12)
Proof. We have,
‖Φ(z1, µ1)− Φ(z2, µ2)‖1 =
∑
s′
|Φ(z1, µ1)(s′)− Φ(z2, µ2)(s′)|
=
∑
s′
|
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
z1(s)µ1(s, a)P (s
′|s, a, z1)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
z2(s)µ2(s, a)P (s
′|s, a, z2)|
=
∑
s′
|
∑
s∈S
z1(s)Pz1,µ1(s
′|s)−
∑
s∈S
z2(s)Pz2,µ2(s
′|s)|
≤
∑
s′
|
∑
s∈S
(z1(s)− z2(s))Pz1,µ1(s′|s)|+
∑
s′
|
∑
s∈S
z2(s)(Pz1,µ1(s
′|s)− Pz2,µ2(s′|s))|
≤ ‖z1 − z2‖1 + ‖Pz1,µ1 − Pz2,µ2‖1
≤ ‖z1 − z2‖1 + ‖Pz1,µ1 − Pz2,µ1‖1 + ‖Pz2,µ1 − Pz2,µ2‖1
(a)
≤ ‖z1 − z2‖1 + C2‖z1 − z2‖1 + C3‖Q1 −Q2‖∞
where (a) follows from Assumption 1.
We use the following Q-learning sample complexity results from [7].
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Theorem 7 (Theorem 4 in [7]). Let Qt be the t-th update in Q-learning algorithm using a polynomial
time learning rate given as αt(s, a) = 1/(nt(s, a) + 1)
w, where nt(s, a) is the number of times the
state-action pair (s, a) is visited until time t and w ∈ (1/2, 1). Let L be the upper bound on the
covering time. Then, P(‖QT0 −Q∗‖∞ ≤ 3) ≥ (1− δ3), for any 0 < 3, δ3 < 1, given that
T0 = Ω
((
L1+3wV 2max ln
( |S||A|Vmax
δ3β3
)
β223
) 1
w
+
(
L
β
ln(
Vmax
3
)
) 1
1−w
)
. (13)
where Vmax = 1/(1− γ), β = (1− γ)/2.
Here the covering time of a state-action pair sequence is the number of steps needed to visit all
state-action pairs starting from any arbitrary state-action pair.
We note that the Q-learning update used in TQ-learning algorithm satisfies all the conditions
necessary for the above theorem. So, we will use the above result. We refer the reader to [7] for the
details.
We now give the proof Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4 . Let {zk} and {µk} be the sequences of mean fields and strategies generated
by the TMFQ-learning algorithm. Let {Qt,k, t ≥ 0} be TQ-learning iterates corresponding to the
mean field zk and let Qk = QT0,k where T0 is as given in (13). We assume that the number of samples
used in the Next-MF function is such that, for any given mean field z and strategy µ, Next-MF
function returns a mean field z′ such that P(‖z′ − Φ(z, µ)‖1 ≤ 3) ≥ (1− δ3).
Define the event Ek = {‖Qk − Q∗zk‖∞ ≤ 3 and ‖zk+1 − Φ(zk, µk)‖1 ≤ 3}. Then, according
to Theorem 7 and the assumption on the Next-MF function, P(Ek) ≥ (1 − 2δ3). Define the event
E = ∩k0k=1Ek. So, P(E) ≥ (1−2k0δ3). We will now analyze the TMFQ-learning algorithm conditioned
on the event E.
Let {z¯k} and {µ¯k} be the sequences of mean fields and strategies generated by the T-BR algorithm.
We assume that T-BR algorithm and TMFQ-learning algorithm have the same initialization, i.e.,
z¯0 = z0. Now, conditioned on the event E,
‖z¯k+1 − zk+1‖1 ≤ ‖Φ(z¯k, µ¯k)− Φ(zk, µk)‖1 + ‖Φ(zk, µk)− zk+1‖1
(a)
≤ (1 + C2)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C3‖Q∗z¯k −Q∗k‖∞ + 3
≤ (1 + C2)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C3‖Q∗z¯k −Q∗zk‖∞ + C3‖Q∗zk −Q∗k‖∞ + 3
(b)
≤ (1 + C2)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C3D‖z¯k − zk‖1 + (C3 + 1)3
≤ (1 + C2 + C3D)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + (C3 + 1)3
Here (a) follows from Lemma 5 and the assumption on the Next-MF function and (b) follows from
Lemma 4.
Iteratively applying the above inequality, we get ‖z¯k0 − zk0‖1 ≤ B3, where B = (1 + C2 +
C3D)
k0+1(C3 + 1). Now, ‖z¯∗− zk0‖1 ≤ ‖z¯∗− z¯k0‖1 + ‖z¯k0 − zk0‖1 ≤ ¯+B3 because ‖z¯∗− z¯k0‖1 ≤ ¯
by the definition of k0.
So, P(‖z¯k0 − zk0‖1 ≤ ¯+B3) ≥ P(E) = 1− 2k0δ.
Setting 3 = ¯/B and δ3 = δ/2k0, and using the corresponding T0 from (13), we get the desired
result.
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Proof of Corollary 1 . Conditioned on the event E as defined in the proof Theorem 4, we get,
‖z¯k+1 − zk+1‖1 ≤ ‖Φ(z¯k, µ¯k)− Φ(zk, µk)‖1 + ‖Φ(zk, µk)− zk+1‖1
(a)
≤ C4‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C5‖Q∗z¯k −Q∗k‖∞ + 3
≤ C4‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C5‖Q∗z¯k −Q∗zk‖∞ + C5‖Q∗zk −Q∗k‖∞ + 3
(b)
≤ C4‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C5D‖z¯k − zk‖1 + (C5 + 1)3
≤ (C4 + C5D)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + (C5 + 1)3
Here (a) follows from Assumption 2 and and (b) follows from Lemma 4.
Iteratively applying the above inequality, we get ‖z¯k0 − zk0‖1 ≤ B3, where
B = (C5 + 1)/(1− ((C4 + C5D))). Rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 5
For a given mean field z, let P̂ (·|·, ·, z) be the estimate of the model obtained by taking n0 next-state
samples for each (s, a). Let F̂z be the approximate TQ-value operator obtained by replacing P by P̂
in (3). Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, it is straight forward to show that F̂z is a contraction.
Let Q̂∗z be its unique fixed point. Since P̂ is different from P , Q̂∗z and Q∗z will also be different.
However, for sufficiently large n0, we can give the following bound.
Lemma 6. For any 0 < 4, δ4 < 1,
P(‖Q̂∗z −Q∗z‖∞ ≤ 4) ≥ (1− δ4), for n0 ≥
2V 4max
24
log
(
2|S||A|
δ4
)
(14)
where Vmax = 1/(1− γ).
Proof.
|Q̂∗z(s, a)−Q∗z(s, a)| = |F̂z(Q̂∗z)(s, a)− Fz(Q∗z)(s, a)|
= γ|
∑
s′
P̂ (s′|s, a, z)G(Q̂∗z)(s′)−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, a, z)G(Q∗z)(s′)|
≤ γ|
∑
s′
P̂ (s′|s, a, z)(G(Q̂∗z)(s′)−G(Q∗z)(s′))|+ γ|
∑
s′
(P̂ (s′|s, a, z)− P (s′|s, a, z))G(Q∗z)(s′)|
(a)
≤ γ‖Q̂∗ −Q∗z‖∞ + γ|
∑
s′
(P̂ (s′|s, a, z))− P (s′|s, a, z))G(Q∗z(s′)|, (15)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1.
For bounding |∑s′(P̂ (s′|s, a, z)− P (s′|s, a, z))G(Q∗z)(s′)|, note that ∑s′ P̂ (s′|s, a, z))G(Q∗z)(s′)
is an unbiased estimated of
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, a, z)G(Q∗z)(s′). Also note that
maxs′ |G(Q∗z)(s′)| ≤ 1/(1− γ) = Vmax. So, by applying Hoeffding’s inequality, for a given (s, a), we
get
P(|
∑
s′
(P̂ (s′|s, a, z))− P (s′|s, a, z))G(Q∗z)(s′)| ≥ ) ≤ 2 exp
(−n02
2V 2max
)
.
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Using the union bound argument, for all (s, a), we get
P(|
∑
s′
(P̂ (s′|s, a, z))− P (s′|s, a, z))G(Q∗z)(s′)| ≤ ) ≥ 1− 2|S||A| exp
(−n02
2V 2max
)
.
So, with n0 ≥ 2V
2
max
2
log
(
2|S||A|
δ
)
,
P(|
∑
s′
(P̂ (s′|s, a, z))− P (s′|s, a, z))G(Q∗z)(s′)| ≤ ) ≤ 1− δ, ∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A. (16)
Now, for the above n0, from (15) and (16), |Q̂∗z(s, a)−Q∗z(s, a)| ≤ γ‖Q̂∗−Q∗z‖∞+, with a probability
greater than (1− δ) for all (s, a). This implies that ‖Q̂∗ −Q∗z‖∞ ≤ /(1− γ) = Vmax. Now, using
 = 4/Vmax and δ = δ4 in the expression for n0 above, we get the desired result.
We now bound the error in the Mckean-Vlasov update due to of replacing P by P̂ .
Lemma 7. Let Φ̂ be the approximate Mckean-Vlasov update function as defined in (1) but by
replacing P by P̂ . Then,
P(‖Φ̂(z, µ)− Φ(z, µ)‖1 ≤ 4) ≥ (1− δ4), for n0 ≥ 2
24
log
(
2|S||S||A|
δ4
)
(17)
Proof. From [23], for a given (s, a),
P(‖P̂ (·|s, a, z)− P (·|s, a, z)‖1 ≥ 4) ≤ 2|S|exp
(−n24
2
)
.
By the union bound argument, for all (s, a), we get
P(‖P̂ (·|s, a, z)− P (·|s, a, z)‖1 ≤ 4) ≥ 1− |S||A|2|S|exp
(−n24
2
)
.
So, with n0 ≥ 224 log
(
2|S||S||A|
δ4
)
P(‖P̂ (·|s, a, z)− P (·|s, a, z)‖1 ≤ 4) ≥ 1− δ4, ∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A. (18)
Now, with the above n0, with a probability greater than (1− δ4), we get
‖Φ̂(z, µ)− Φ(z, µ)‖1 =
∑
s′
|Φ̂(z, µ)(s′)− Φ(z, µ)(s′)|
≤
∑
s′
∑
s
∑
a
z(s)µ(s, a)|P̂ (s′|s, a, z)− P (s′|s, a, z)|
=
∑
s
∑
a
z(s)µ(s, a)‖P̂ (·|s, a, z)− P (·|s, a, z)‖1 ≤ 4
where the last inequality follows from (18) and the fact that
∑
s
∑
a z(s)µ(s, a) = 1.
We now give the proof Theorem 5.
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Proof of Theorem 5 . Let {zk} and {µk} be the sequences of mean fields and strategies generated
by the GMBL algorithm. Let n0 be the maximum of the two values given by Lemma 6 and Lemma
7, i.e,
n0 = max
(
2V 4max
24
log
(
2|S||A|
δ4
)
,
2
24
log
(
2|S||S||A|
δ4
))
Define the event Ek = {‖Q̂∗zk − Q∗zk‖∞ ≤ 4 and ‖Φ̂(zk, µk) − Φ(zk, µk)‖1 ≤ 4}. Then, from
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, we get P(Ek) ≥ (1 − 2δ4). Define the event E = ∩k0k=1Ek. So, P(E) ≥
(1− 2k0δ4). We will now analyze the GMBL algorithm conditioned on the event E.
Let {z¯k} and {µ¯k} be the sequences of mean fields and strategies generated by the T-BR algorithm.
We assume that T-BR algorithm and GMBL algorithm have the same initialization, i.e., z¯0 = z0.
Now, conditioned on the event E
‖z¯k+1 − zk+1‖1 = ‖Φ(z¯k, µ¯k)− Φ̂(zk, µk)‖1
≤ ‖Φ(z¯k, µ¯k)− Φ(zk, µk)‖1 + ‖Φ(zk, µk)− Φ̂(zk, µk)‖1
(a)
≤ (1 + C2)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C3‖Q∗z¯k − Q̂∗zk‖∞ + 4
≤ (1 + C2)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C3‖Q∗z¯k −Q∗zk‖∞ + C3‖Q∗zk − Q̂∗zk‖∞ + 4
(b)
≤ (1 + C2)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + C3D‖z¯k − zk‖1 + (C3 + 1)4
≤ (1 + C2 + C3D)‖z¯k − zk‖1 + (C3 + 1)4
Here (a) follows from Lemma 5 and (b) follows from Lemma 4.
Iteratively applying the above inequality, we get ‖z¯k0 − zk0‖1 ≤ B4, where B = (1 + C2 +
C3D1)
k0+1(C3 + 1). Now, conditioned on the event E, we have
‖z¯∗ − zk0‖1 ≤ ‖z¯∗ − z¯k0‖1 + ‖z¯k0 − zk0‖1 ≤ ¯+B4
because ‖z¯∗ − z¯k0‖1 ≤ ¯ by the definition of k0.
Setting 4 = ¯/B and δ4 = δ/2k0 in the expression for n0, we get the desired result.
D Experiments
D.1 Parameters for Infection Spread Model
We use the following parameters for simulations
|S| = 25 |A| = 5 k = 0.05 δ1 = 1 δ2 = 0.2 δ3 = 0.01 ζ = 0.1  = 0.3 γ = 0.75
w1 ∼
{
uniform{1, 2, 3} w.p 0.9
0 w.p 0.1
w2 ∼
{
uniform{0, · · · , s} w.p 0.9
0 w.p 0.1
For GMBL, we set n0 = 500 and we run the outer loop for 500 iterations. For TMFQL we run Q
Learning for 1000 time steps, and preform 5000 iterations of the outer loop. For O-TMFQ Learning,
run the outer loop for 5000 iterations with different number of agents. For better sample efficiency,
in both TMFQL and O-TMFQ Learning we initialize the Q function at each iteration with Q of the
previous iteration. We used a logarithmically decaying learning rate, we decay the learning rate
from 10−3 to 10−2.
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D.2 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and other Gig Economy Marketplaces
We consider Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) as an example of a Gig economy marketplace, which
includes firms like Uber and Airbnb. MTurk is a crowd sourcing market, wherein human workers are
recruited to perform so-called Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). These HITs may take the form of
labeling data sets or other tasks that are simple from a human’s perspective, but might be difficult
for machine learning to directly undertake. The workers are called Turkers, and each has a quality
score that depends on previous HITs undertaken. The firm that originates these HITs may specify
the price that it is willing to pay, as well as the minimum quality of the Turkers that it desires.
There is a natural alignment of effort employed by Turkers in MTurk, since higher efforts translate
into HITs done right, which in turn results in a higher quality, which finally results in firms willing
to pay more per HIT. Thus, if mean field quality is high, there is an incentive to perform HITs
well and enhance ones’ own quality. This notion of incentive alignment applies to essentially all
Gig economy marketplaces—the reputation of the agent directly enhances its reward, while the
reputation of the marketplace as a whole (i.e., its mean field) draws customers willing to pay into
the system, and so enhances the reward of the agent.
The formal system description is analogous to Infection Spread considered earlier, but we focus
here on the application scenario. Thus, we have that each agent (Turker) has his/her quality state,
and the strategic action is the choice of how much work to put into a HIT assigned to that Turker.
Higher effort implies higher cost, but also implies a higher improvement in the quality. The overall
reward is a combination that depends on the Turker’s quality as well as the mean field quality.
Let s denote the quality of a Turker’s profile, and let action a denote the effort the turker puts in
to maintain the quality of the profile; this may include number of jobs successfully completed, time
taken to complete a job etc. Let c(a) = δ3a denote the cost incurred in performing action a. The
quality perceived by an entity offering jobs depends on both the quality of the individual Turker
and the population as a whole (via the mean field). Thus, the reward to a Turker is a function of
the perceived quality and cost incurred in taking action. We define state transition and reward as
follows,
s′ = (s+ a− w1)+1{E1}+ w21{E2}
r = δ1s+ δ2
∑
s∈S
sz(s)− δ3a,
where E1, E2 are mutually exclusive events that occur with probabilities 1− ζ, ζ, respectively, and
w1, w2 are realizations of non-negative integer random variables.
We use the following parameters for simulations,
|S| = 100 |A| = 5 δ1 = 0.5 δ2 = 0.2 ζ = 0.1  = 0.3 γ = 0.75
w1 ∼ uniform{0, 1, 2, 3} w2 ∼
{
uniform{0, · · · , |S|} w.p 0.9
0 w.p 0.1
For O-TMFQ Learning, we run the outer iteration for 7000 steps. As before, for better sample
efficiency we initialize the Q function at each iteration with Q of the previous iteration. We used a
logarithmically decaying learning rate, we decay the learning rate from 10−3 to 10−2. The behavior
of our RL algorithms is much the same as the earlier case, and is shown in Figures 7–10. Figure
7 shows the pdf of the final mean field distribution obtained by performing O-TMFQL with 2000
agents with different values of δ3 while figure 8 shows the average state of the population. Observe
that as the cost of action δ3 increases, agents take lower actions and are hence distributed towards
lower states. Figure 9 is a heat map of the final TQ value function. Figure 10 shows the mean state
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Figure 7: PDF of O-TMFQ-Learning
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Figure 8: Mean state of O-TMFQ-Learning
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Figure 9: Heat map of TQ Values for δ3 = 0.1.
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Figure 10: Mean state of O-TMFQ-Learning:
δ3 = 0.1
evolution with different number of agents for δ3 = 0.1. Observe that the convergence is poor with
lesser number of agents.
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